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Abstract
This paper investigates banks’ corporate social responsibility. Two dif-
ferent competitive credit markets do exist: one for standard projects and
one for ethical ones. Ethical projects have also a social proﬁtability, but a
lower (positive) expected revenue with respect to standard ones. Ethical
projects are ﬁnanced by ethical banks and undertaken by motivated bor-
rowers. These borrowers obtain additional beneﬁt (a social responsibility
premium) from accomplishing ethical projects when trading with ethical
banks.
If the expected proﬁtability of ethical project is suﬃciently close to
that of standard ones and/or the social responsibility premium of mo-
tivated borrowers is suﬃciently high, the market for ethical projects is
active and the credit market is fully segmented. This result holds true
irrespective of the information structure: only moral hazard on the bor-
rower side, moral hazard and screening on the borrower side, moral hazard
on the borrower side and screening on the lender side. The optimal con-
tract in our set-up is always a debt contract. However, its precise form
and welfare properties depend on the information structure.
Jel classiﬁcation: D86, G21, G30.
Key-words: corporate social responsibility, ethical banks, motivated
borrowers, microﬁnance.
1 Introduction
According to the standard shareholder-value approach ﬁrms are controlled by
proﬁt-maximizing shareholders and the ﬁrms’ interaction with other stakehold-
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1ers is simply managed by contracts and regulation. However, in recent years,
society’s and lawmakers’ interest and demand for corporate social responsibility
(CSR) have dramatically increased (see, for example, the Green Paper “Promot-
ing a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility” prepared by the
Commission of the European Communities in 2001). CSR has been interpreted
as a response to market and redistributive failures alternative to government
intervention. Following Benabou and Tirole (2009), “a standard deﬁnition of
CSR is that it is about sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the social interest. For there to
be a sacriﬁce, the ﬁrm must go beyond its legal and contractual obligations,
on a voluntary basis. CSR embraces a wide range of behaviors, such as being
employee friendly, environment friendly, mindful of ethics, respectful of commu-
nities where the ﬁrm’s plants are located, and even investor friendly” (Bénabou
and Tirole 2009, page 2). In practice, as the authors clarify, CSR can be trans-
lated essentially in one of the three following situations: the adoption of a more
long-term perspective by ﬁrms, the delegated exercise of prosocial behavior on
behalf to stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy.
CSR is also developing in the banking industry and it is becoming an im-
portant tool for many companies’ management and work force. CSR by lenders
(Ethical Banks) can be interpreted as delegated philanthropy since, as mentioned
before, the ﬁrm can be a channel of stakeholders’ values. In the case of bank-
ing crucial stakeholders are obviously investors: socially responsible investors
provide saving to ethical banks and want the corporation to use their saving to
ﬁnance social responsible project and ﬁrms1 (see, for example, the Report on
Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the U.S. prepared in 2007 by the Social
Investment Forum). Example of ethical banks are the following: Wainwright
Bank and ShoreBank2 in the U.S.A., Cooperative Bank and Charity Bank in
the U.K., Ekobank in Sweden, Cultura Sparebank in Norway, Triodos Bank in
the Netherland, Ethikbank and GLS Bank in Germany, LaNef in France, Banca
Popolare Etica and Banca Prossima in Italy, Grameen Bank in Bangladesh,
BID Amerique in Latin America and in the Caribbean area. In Islamic banking
(spread over 51 countries, including the United States), interest-free loan (qard
hassan) are today quite frequent and funds must comply with Islamic principles
(see also the Islamic Development Bank).
Also borrowers, through their economic activities, can promote social values.
Motivated borrowers may provide services to individuals (for example services
to persons with disabilities or rehabilitation services), culture and education
diﬀusion, may promote the environment as well as art fruition and protection,
access to work, protection and enhancement of minorities, local and community
development and so forth.
1Socially responsible investors frequently accept, for their investment, a lower interest rate
with respect to the market one.
2ShoreBank was founded in 1973 to prove that money could be lent proﬁtably to
poor people in poor neighborhoods, un experiment that became known as "community-
development ﬁnance". On August 2010 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
called time on its experiment. (From "ShoreBank: Small Enough to Fail - The Sorry
End to a Bold Banking Experiment". Economist. August 26, 2010, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16891993).
2We deﬁne ethical banks as “corporate social responsible” lenders since they
can commit to fund only socially relevant projects. While borrowers are called
“motivated” since they prefer to engage in socially valuable activities, without
necessarily committing to them.
In spite of its importance, a little consideration is given in the economics
literature to ethics in ﬁnance in general and to ethics in banks in particular
(exception is the literature on microcredit, e.g., Stiglitz 1990, Besley and Coate
1995, Ghatak 1999 and the large empirical literature which followed). Few
works, mainly in the business literature, analyze ethical banks and show the
relevant role of ethical banking as an independent activity (e.g., Lynch, 1991;
San-Jose, Retolaza and Gutierrez, 2009). From Green (1989) and Lynch (1991)
there are two accepted characteristics to deﬁne the ethical banking: i) social
proﬁtability, understood as funding economic activities with social added value
and as the absence in any case of investments in speculative projects or in those
that fulﬁll negative social criteria; ii) economic proﬁtability, which means non
negative proﬁts. The dimension of proﬁt obviously refers to the good man-
agement of the bank, because ethical banks do not distribute beneﬁts between
stockholders or, if they do so, the distribution is very limited.
In this paper we analyze banks CSR when oﬀering loan agreements to en-
trepreneurs wishing to invest in ethical projects. In particular we investigate
how social responsible lenders and motivated borrowers interact with each oth-
ers when they compete in a credit market where also standard lenders and
borrowers do operate.
In the model, ethical projects are those providing both social3 and economic
advantages, but which deliver lower expected revenue with respect to standard
ones. Diﬀerently from standard proﬁt maximizing banks, socially responsible
lenders commit to invest in ethical projects.4
There exist two types of borrowers in the market: standard proﬁt maximizing
entrepreneurs and socially motivated ones. The latter obtain an additional
beneﬁt (a premium for social responsibility) from trading with ethical banks
if the project is successful. This implies that motivated borrowers prefer to
trade with ethical banks as long as loan conditions are not too unfavorable with
respect to those oﬀered by standard lenders.
Both project types are subject to moral hazard: the two types of entrepre-
neurs can behave or misbehave (see Tirole 2006). As mentioned before, moti-
3To give some examples of ethical projects, the Co-operative Bank (UK) supports both
smaller local charities and high proﬁle international organizations. It invests in projects
within the renewable energy and carbon reduction sectors by funding a wide range of re-
newable energy projects. It provides services to Housing Associations including term loans
and investments. It actively supports social enterprises by helping organizations that share
its co-operative values of fairness and social responsibility and are committed to transform-
ing lives through making social, economic and environmental change. (From the web-site
http://www.co-operativebank.co.uk, consulted in November 2011)
4As an example of commitment to ethical projects, on the web site of Charity Bank (UK)
on reads "Providing aﬀordable charity loans and loans to social enterprises and other com-
munity organizations that beneﬁt people and the planet, is our mission. As a charity and
social enterprise ourselves we understand how the sector works and are here to help your
organization". (Available at http://www.charitybank.org, consulted in November 2011)
3vated borrowers trading with ethical banks gain a social responsibility premium
when the project is successful, thus making the moral hazard problem less severe.
Consequently, if the premium for social responsibility is high enough (and/or
the proﬁtability of ethical projects is not much lower than that of standard
ones), ethical banks can oﬀer a better contract to motivated borrowers than
those oﬀered by standard banks.
First we analyze the case where the borrowers’ behavior is private informa-
tion (moral hazard only). We then investigate the case where the borrowers’
behavior and their preferences for social issues are private information (moral
hazard and adverse selection both on the borrowers’ side). Finally we consider
the case where the borrowers’ behavior and the lenders’ preferences for corporate
social responsibility are not observable (moral hazard on the borrowers’ side and
adverse selection on the lenders’ side). Even though one usually tends to distin-
guish ethical bank from microcredit, we also provide a possible reinterpretation
of the model in term of microﬁnance.
Our results are all driven by the interplay of the two crucial parameters of the
model: the diﬀerence in expected revenue from standard and ethical projects and
the premium for social responsibility received by motivated borrowers trading
with ethical banks.
We ﬁrst show that only socially motivated borrowers will engage in ethical
projects. If the premium for social responsibility is low (and/or the proﬁtabil-
ity of ethical projects is much lower than that of standard ones), then ethical
banks cannot operate. If, instead, the premium is high enough (and/or the
diﬀerence between the two projects proﬁtability is not too large) and the two
lenders’ type is observable, the ethical banks are active and the market is fully
segmented. That is, proﬁt maximizing agents trade among themselves in the
market for standard projects and ethical banks trade with motivated borrowers
in the market for ethical projects. The optimal second best contract is a debt
one in both markets. The cost of moral-hazard is lower in the ethical projects
market. Consequently, when the ethical projects market is active, under moral
hazard the debt contract always provides a higher funding to motivated bor-
rowers. It also allows a higher revenue to the motivated borrower when the
premium for social responsibility is suﬃciently high. Moreover, we proved that
all of the previous results hold also under moral hazard and adverse selection
on the borrower’ side. However, when the ethical projects market is active, mo-
tivated borrowers are worse oﬀ with respect to the second-best, while standard
receive the second best contract. Finally, under moral hazard on the borrowers’
side and adverse selection on the lenders’ side the market is fully segmented
again and the second-best contract is oﬀered to both agents’ types, whatever
the diﬀerence in expected revenue from standard and ethical projects and the
premium for social responsibility.
Our results show that if the premium for social responsibility is suﬃciently
high (and/or the diﬀerential between proﬁtability of the two project types is
low enough), the beneﬁt from the matching between motivated borrowers and
ethical lenders always occurs through a perfect segmentation of the market
for any considered information structure. The reason of the result is that the
4socially responsible lenders and the motivated borrowers can solve the moral
hazard problem in a cheaper way if they are matched together than if they
are matched with standard agents. If the premium for social responsibility is
suﬃciently high (and/or the diﬀerence in projects proﬁtability is low), the more
eﬃcient solution of the moral hazard problem more than compensate the lower
proﬁtability of ethical projects and segmentation increases the overall eﬃciency
of the credit market.
The beneﬁcial matching between agents of similar type recalls Besley and
Ghatack (2005). However, they assume that the workers’ and employers’ types
(whether the worker is mission oriented or not) are observable by the partner;
we instead consider also the case where private information exists either on the
borrowers’ or on the lenders’ type. As a consequence the ﬁrst part of our paper
investigates a situation similar to the one analyzed by Besley and Ghatack, while
the second one considers an extension to the case of asymmetric information on
the agents’ type.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe how socially
responsible lenders and motivated borrowers are modeled and how they interact
in the market where also standard proﬁt maximizer agents exist. We also present
the diﬀerent information structures considered in the paper. In Section 3 we
investigate loan agreements when the motivated and standard borrowers have
private information on the behavior exerted in making the project successful.
In Section 4 we analyze the case of loan agreements under moral-hazard and
adverse selection on the borrowers’ side and in Section 5 we brieﬂy consider
the case of loan agreements under moral-hazard on the borrowers’ side and
adverse selection on the lenders’ side. Finally, Section 6 presents a possible
re-interpretation of the model in terms of microﬁnance and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model Set-up
The model borrows from Tirole (2006). We consider a credit market with a
large numbers of both risk neutral borrowers (she) and lenders (he). The risk
free interest rate is normalized to zero.
Borrowers have to undertake a project which needs an investment. Each
borrower can apply for at most one lending and diﬀerent projects type exist.
We call Ik the amount of the investment, where k ∈ {0,1} is an indicator of the
type of project. When k = 1 the project is “ethical” and when k = 0 the project
is “not-ethical”. The diﬀerence between the two projects will be speciﬁed below.
The borrowers owns an asset A, with A < Ik. In words, the borrowers have not
enough capital and/or collateral whatever is the project they are interested in,
hence they have to borrow Ik −A. We assume for simplicity that A is the same
for all borrowers.




, with RSk > RFk ≥ 0, where RSk is the cash ﬂow per unit
of investment in case of success, and RFk in case of failure.
Ethical projects represent all projects leading to social beneﬁts, beyond prof-
5its (as an example projects that improve communities, and have a positive im-
pact on the environment). We do not model this aspect of ethical projects, which
will then be taken for granted. Ethical projects can be thought of as being a
subset of standard ones. For this reason one can assume that the proﬁtability
of ethical projects is on average lower than that of standard ones. We capture
this idea with the following assumption: RS0 ≥ RS1 and RF0 = RF1, such that
∆R1 = RS1−RF1 ≤ ∆R0 = RS0−RF0. The two types of projects are perfectly
observable and have independent distributions. Finally, and considering both
projects types, the total cash ﬂow is RXk  Ik > 0, with X ∈ {F,S}. RFkIk can
be considered as the liquidation value of the assets.
The project is subject to moral hazard: the entrepreneurs can behave or mis-
behave. If they behave the probability of success is pH, otherwise it is pL, with
pH > pL. We deﬁne ∆p ≡ pH − pL. However, if the entrepreneurs misbehave,
they will enjoy a private beneﬁt whose value is P  I. The private beneﬁt will be
nought otherwise. The borrowers are protected by limited liability: hence their
income cannot be negative. Given limited liability, the moral hazard problem
is relevant even though both agents are risk neutral.
There are also two types of banks and entrepreneurs, denoted respectively
as i ∈ {0,1} and j ∈ {0,1}. Both for lenders and borrowers type 0 denotes
the standard agents, while type 1 indicates the agents aware of social issues.
The percentage of motivated borrowers in the credit market is q whereas that
of standard ones is 1 − q. This information is common knowledge.
Both in case of success and of failure, revenues are shared between lenders
and borrowers: LXk
ij and BXk
ij respectively are the income of a lender of type i
trading with a borrower of type j and of a borrower of type j trading with a
lender of type i, when the investment is of type k and the state of the world is X.
We obviously have that LXk
ij +BXk
ij = RXk Ik




speciﬁes the type of project, the amount invested and, how revenues are shared
between lenders and borrowers both in case of success and of failure, given the
type of the two agents trading together.





ij + ˜ θij
 
+ (1 − p(a))BFk
ij − A + (1 − a)PIk
ij (1)
where a ∈ {0,1} is the behavior of the entrepreneur. In particular, a = 0 if
the entrepreneur misbehaves, while a = 1 if he behaves. The entrepreneur’s
behavior determines the probability of success which becomes p(1) = pH and
p(0) = pL respectively.
˜ θij is the premium for social responsibility and it depends on the type of
borrower and lender, that is, ˜ θij = θ > 0 if i = j = 1, and ˜ θij = 0 otherwise.
In fact, the (1−q) standard borrowers never receive a premium for social re-
sponsibility, whereas the q motivated borrowers receive a non pecuniary beneﬁt
(whose monetary value is θ) only when they trade with ethical banks. This is in
line with Besley and Ghatack’s idea of good matching between agents sharing
the same mission.
6In fact, once the loan contract has been signed, the motivated borrower has
more willingness to repay the debt to a socially responsible lender. This occurs
since, in a dynamic perspective, the motivated borrower anticipates that, if the
ethical bank makes proﬁts, it will use the liquidity to ﬁnance other social and
solidarity-based projects and, conversely, if it makes losses it won’t be able to
ﬁnance them. Since ethical banks are committed to invest in ethical projects
(see below), the premium for social responsibility is positive only if motivated
borrowers interact with an ethical bank and undertake an ethical project.
One could object that the main concern for a motivated borrower should be
to accomplish a socially valuable project and therefore one could ﬁnd it reason-
able to assume that ˜ θij > 0 even if the ethical project is ﬁnanced by a standard
bank. However, in that case, our model would not provide an explanation for
the existence of ethical banks since commercial lenders would ﬁnance both stan-
dard projects and ethical ones, provided that θ is suﬃciently high.5 Moreover,
we think that the assumption of a positive premium for CSR when the ethical
project is ﬁnanced by a standard bank is not consistent with the kind of moral
hazard we assumed. Moral hazard here, and in all the literature on corporate
ﬁnance as well, does not correspond to the “incentive to shirk on a given task”.
In our speciﬁc model moral hazard translates into a higher (or lower) willingness
to repay the debt to an ethical (standard) bank.
Note that motivated borrowers prefer to trade with ethical banks as long
as ethical projects proﬁtability is not too low with respect to standard project
proﬁtability. In that case the premium for social responsibility θ can compensate
the diﬀerence in proﬁtability between the two project types. In diﬀerent words,
in our formulation, if the gains in proﬁts are suﬃciently high, the motivated
borrower behaves as a standard one. This is in line with the economics and
psychology literature where it is acknowledged that the psychological motives
are relevant if the material payoﬀs are not too big (see Rabin 1993).
On the contrary standard borrowers prefer the loan contract assuring them
the highest expected revenue, whatever the type of project involved. As we will
show in Subsection 3.2, when the premium for social responsibility is positive
and ethical projects proﬁtability is not too low, ethical banks can control moral
hazard at a lower cost with respect to standard lenders trading with borrowers
of the same type.
Standard lenders maximize their proﬁts. When their moral hazard problem
is taken care of, expected proﬁts become:
pHLS0
0j + (1 − pH)LF0
0j − I0
0j + A (2)
Standard lenders invest in non-ethical projects to obtain higher expected proﬁts,
so that k = 0 in the previous objective function. In fact, motivated borrowers
would gain a social responsibility parameter θ equal to zero when trading with
standard lenders and so no advantages can be found in terms of less costly moral
hazard in that case.
5About drawbacks of possible alternative model strategies see also Footnote 9.
7As mentioned in the introduction we interpret lenders’ corporate social re-
sponsibility as delegated philanthropy. In particular, the bank is a channel of
its stakeholders values: socially responsible investors provide saving to ethical
banks and want the corporation to use their saving to ﬁnance social responsi-
ble projects. In particular, ethical banks maximize expected proﬁt as standard
lenders but, diﬀerently from them, are able to commit in investing only in ethi-
cal projects.6 As a consequence, socially responsible lenders’ objective function
is:
pHLS1
1j + (1 − pH)LF1
1j − I1
1j + A (3)
Note that ethical banks only invest in ethical projects, no matter which type
of borrowers is undertaking the ethical project7, so that k = 1 in (3). Since
ethical projects have a lower proﬁtability than standard ones, ethical banks are
ready to sacriﬁce proﬁts in the social interest. This is in line with the deﬁnition
of CSR provided in the introduction.8
2.1 Information Structures
The assumption that the ethical nature of the project is common knowledge
seems rather natural, in fact it implies that the creditor can observe the invest-
ment that was ﬁnanced.9
We will consider two versions of the model. In both versions we will assume
that the project type is common knowledge and that borrowers have private
information on their behavior (making the project successful or not).
In the former version of the model we do not allow for adverse selection
issues. The type of the borrowers is common knowledge (the banks observe
whether the borrowers are motivated or not), but lenders cannot observe the
borrowers’ behavior. We call this model the second-best one (Section 3).
Thereafter we relax the assumption that the borrowers’ type is common
knowledge. The setting with moral hazard and adverse selection on the bor-
rowers’ side captures the situation where lenders are banks that built up a
reputation or can set up credible commitment devices in their statute, while
6In a previous version of the paper we assumed that ethical banks maximized the total
revenue from ethical projects, in analogy with Blinder (1993)’s assumption for stakeholder-
oriented manufacturing ﬁrms. Nothing substantial changed in the analysis with respect to the
current version.
7Thus the ethical banks are indiﬀerent between ﬁnancing a motivated borrower or a proﬁt
maximizer one, provided that they undertake an ethical project, other things equal. However,
as we will clarify later on, if an ethical bank wishes to satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint for the proﬁt maximizer it cannot match the oﬀer of the commercial bank, since
standard projects have a higher expected return.
8As will be clear in the following of the paper, the higher θ the lower the cost of providing
incentives to the motivated borrowers. Thus, in the ethical banks’ objective function, LS1
11 is
actually increasing in θ. Concerning our interpretation of CSR as delegated philanthropy, this
implies that not only depositors of ethical banks want their capital to be invested in ethical
projects, but they are also “happier” when a ﬁnanced ethical project is successful.
9However, the borrower could use the loan to ﬁnance projects diﬀerent from the contracted
one. In the present model, we will not deal with this kind of moral hazard and leave it for
future research.
8borrowers are start-ups, new ﬁrms without reputation. We call the solution of
this model third best (Section 4). In Section 5 we will also brieﬂy discuss the case
where lenders cannot observe the borrowers’ behavior but banks have private
information on their corporate social responsibility. This assumption captures
the situation called “strategic corporate social responsibility” (see Baron 2001)
where a ﬁrm can pretend to be socially responsible only to strength its market
position, for example to attract the better customers (in our model, under some
conditions, better customers are the motivated borrowers). In this case lenders
either are new banks who have no reputation yet or are well established ﬁrms
who announce a change in their corporate social attitude but are not able to
set up credible commitment devices for corporate social responsibility (for ex-
ample, what is written in their statute does not impose stringent constraints on
behavior). While here borrowers are ﬁrms well established in the market that
already built up a reputation.
Finally in Section 6, where we oﬀer an alternative interpretation of the model
in terms of microﬁnance, we still consider the case of second-best (the type of
the borrowers is common knowledge, but lenders cannot observe the borrowers’
behavior).
2.2 Preliminaries
Let us consider the cash ﬂow per unit of investment I. In this subsection we omit
the superscript of the project type, k, since this does not raise any confusion.
We will assume:
pHRSIij + (1 − pH)RFIij − Iij > 0
pLRSIij + (1 − pL)RFIij + PIij − Iij < 0
therefore the net present value of both projects (ethical and non-ethical) is
positive if the borrower behaves and negative otherwise. The two conditions
can be simpliﬁed as:
pH∆R + RF > 1 (4)
pL∆R + RF + P < 1 (5)
Hence, if it is not possible to take care of the moral hazard problem the invest-
ment cannot be carried over.
Expected proﬁt of both standard and socially responsible lenders must be













ij + (1 − pH)LF






















+ RFIij − BF
ij ≥ Iij − A
9or
pH∆RIij + RFIij − Iij − BF
ij + A ≥ pH∆Bij (7)
where ∆Bij = BS
ij − BF
ij.
3 Loan Agreements under Moral Hazard
Corporate social responsibility of both borrowers and lenders is observable, but
lenders cannot observe the borrowers’ behavior.
Remind that motivated borrowers will trade with ethical banks as long as the
expected proﬁt from ethical projects is not too low with respect to the expected
proﬁt from standard ones.
We assume Bertrand competition among lenders. This brings banks’ proﬁts
to zero and borrowers consequently keep all the surplus from loan agreements.
This is equivalent to endowing the borrowers with all the bargaining power and
having them proposing the contract to lenders. Thus, the optimal contract












As a consequence the timing of the second-best game is equivalent to that
of the following game:
• First the representative borrower oﬀers a contract to lenders, specifying a
loan agreement.
• Second, lenders accept or refuse the contract.
• Then the borrower decides whether behave or misbehave
• Finally, uncertainty concerning the project is solved and the contract is
implemented.
To characterize the credit market structure under pure moral hazard we
proceed in the following way: (i) we ﬁnd the optimal contract signed by (both
types of) borrowers when trading with standard lenders. (ii) We describe the
optimal contract signed by standard borrowers when trading with ethical banks
and we show that standard borrowers always prefer to trade with standard
lenders. (iii) We show the optimal contract signed by motivated borrowers
when trading with ethical banks. (iv) We compare the contracts oﬀered by
standard and ethical lenders and we show that motivated borrowers prefer to
trade with ethical banks only when the premium for social responsibility is
suﬃciently high (and/or the diﬀerence in proﬁtability between the two projects
types is suﬃciently low). This allows us to identify conditions such that the
market for ethical projects is active and thus ethical banks can operate.
103.1 Borrowers Trading with standard Lenders




where the subscript j means that we are considering both types of borrowers
and superscript 0 means that the borrowers invest in standard projects. Re-
mind that, when trading with a standard bank, the two borrower’s types have
the same objective function (the premium for social responsibility θ is zero).








0j +(1 − pH)BF0
0j +I0
0j −A ≥ pL  BS0
0j +(1 − pL)BF0









where ∆B0j = BS0
0j − BF0
0j , which is the diﬀerence in the borrower’s revenue in
case of success and failure, for given contract.
Following Tirole (2006), chapter 3, the problem of a borrower trading with
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has been obtained substituting the incentive compatibility con-
straint (8) in inequality (7) and re-arranging. Moreover, always following Tirole







+ RF < 1 (10)
therefore I0












the previous inequality expresses the borrowing capacity of the entrepreneur,
trading with a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm.
Solution to the Program (9) is described in the following remark.
Remark 1 The optimal contract for a borrower trading with a standard lender































Proof. See the appendix A.1.
The implications of the formulas in Remark 1 are the usual ones in this kind
of models. (12) tells that ﬁrms’ borrowing capacity I0∗
0j is increasing in tangible
assets A, i.e. the higher is A, the lower is credit rationing. Borrowing capacity
I0∗
0j is also decreasing in agency costs (private beneﬁt, P, or inverse likelihood
ratio,
pH
∆p). The fact that BF0∗
0j = 0, instead, implies that the optimal contract is
a debt one, which gives the highest incentives of behaving to the entrepreneur,
which is the well known Jensen and Meckling (1976) result.
3.2 Borrowers Trading with Socially Responsible Lenders




10), where the subscript 10 means that we are considering eth-
ical banks together with standard borrowers and superscript 1 means that the
borrowers invest in ethical projects.
In the same way a contract for a standard borrower trading with a standard
lender is denoted by (BS0
00 ,BF0
00 ,I0







are very similar contracts: the premium for social responsibility is always zero
and the unique diﬀerence is in the fact that, when trading with ethical banks,
standard borrowers must undertake ethical projects.
Considering that ethical projects generate a lower expected revenue with
respect to standard ones, it is easy to check that standard borrowers prefer to













































12Remark 2 In the case of pure moral hazard, standard borrowers always prefer
to trade with standard banks.
We now consider contracts that are designed for motivated borrowers.




11), where the superscript 1 indicates that only ethical
projects can be ﬁnanced in this case. The incentive compatibility constraint of























where ∆B11 = BS1
11 − BF1
11 .
If the parameter θ is suﬃciently high, the previous incentive compatibil-
ity constraint is more easily satisﬁed than the one before (see inequality 8).10
In diﬀerent words, if borrowers’ motivation is suﬃcient to compensate ethical
10Note that, if θ is suﬃciently high, then the ethical bank could set ∆B11 = 0 and the
incentive constraint (14) would still be satisﬁed. The previous extreme situation can appear




ij + (1 − p(a))BFk
ij − A + (1 − a) ˜ PIk
ij
where the private beneﬁt parameter ˜ P ∈ {P0,P1}, with P1 < P0, depends on the borrowers’
and the lenders’ type. Namely, ˜ P = P1 if a motivated borrower matches with an ethical bank,
and ˜ P = P0 when a matching involving at least one standard proﬁt maximizer agent occurs.
With this speciﬁcation all our results still hold and the extreme case where θ is so high that
a motivated borrower does not misbehave when ∆B11 = 0 can be avoided. However this

























the share of investment that the borrower requires in order to behave is constant for any level
of investment for both kind of borrowers, which is rather unrealistic.
Moreover, in our formulation, if the gain in proﬁts are very high, the motivated borrowers
behaves as a proﬁt maximizer. In the formulation provided in this footnote, this is not
necessarily the case, since intrinsic incentives are proportional to investment. To avoid this
unrealistic prediction we could incorporate a ﬁxed negative intrinsic motivation parameter in
the value of the private beneﬁt, but in this case the model would be totally equivalent to the
present one.
A slightly diﬀerent version of this speciﬁcation will however be used in our microﬁnance
interpretation of the model (see Section 6), where the sum at stake are small almost by
deﬁnition.
13projects’ low proﬁtability, agents aware of social issues interacting together can
implement more eﬃcient contracts, as we show below.
Remind that the participation constraint of socially responsible lenders is
the same as for the standard ones:
pHLS1
11 + (1 − pH)LF1
11 ≥ I1
11 − A (15)
Thus, despite the presence of the premium for social responsibility θ, we can
follow the same steps as in the previous case. The problem of a representative





pH∆B11 + pHθ + BF1
11 − A









pH∆R1 + RF − 1
 
I1
11 − pH∆B11 − BF1






Solution to the previous program is described in the following remark.
Remark 3 The contract for a motivated borrower trading with an ethical bank



























Proof. See the appendix A.2.
In the following Remark we provide conditions for the motivated entrepre-
neur being able to invest more than the standard one and/or obtaining a higher
revenue in the case of success.
Remark 4 Motivated borrowers trading with an ethical bank:







0j (∆R0 − ∆R1) ≡ θ (18)









pH∆R1 + RF − 1
≡ θ (19)
where condition (19) implies condition (18), or θ < θ.
14Proof. See the Appendix A.3.
As one can check, both conditions (18) and (19) require that the expected
proﬁt from the ethical projects is not too smaller than that from the other
projects (∆R0 − ∆R1 is low), or that the premium for social responsibility θ is
high enough.
We can compare the contracts oﬀered by the two types of banks as follows:
Remark 5 The contracts oﬀered by standard and socially responsible lenders
are as follows:





































Obviously, if (19) holds so that θ ≥ θ, then motivated borrowers prefer to
trade with socially responsible lenders since, by doing so, they can both beneﬁt
from their socially responsibility premium and they can also obtain a better
contract.
Suppose now that (18) does not hold so that θ < θ. Motivated borrowers
receive in this case a higher loan and a higher expected proﬁt when they trade
with standard lenders. In principle they could even then prefer to trade with
socially responsible banks, if the premium for social responsibility θ more than
compensate better contract conditions. However we ﬁnd that:
Remark 6 (18) is a necessary condition for motivated borrowers to trade with
socially responsible lenders (θ ≥ θ).
Proof. See the Appendix A.4.
The previous remark states that, if θ ≥ θ, then motivated borrowers pre-
fer to trade with socially responsible lenders even if, by doing so, they re-










0j ) obtained in Remark 1 becomes (BS0∗
00 ,BF0∗
00 ,I0∗
00) since it is
signed only by standard borrowers. This implies that the market is fully seg-
mented in that case.
However, if the opposite of condition (18) holds (θ < θ), and the contract





motivated borrowers will prefer to trade with standard lenders. This implies
that ethical banks are not active in the credit market in this case.
The following proposition summarizes results in subsections (3.1) and (3.2):
Proposition 1 Moral hazard. Suppose that borrowers’ type is observable, but
lenders cannot observe the borrowers’ behavior.
15• If condition (18) holds (θ ≥ θ), then the credit market is fully segmented







to standard and motivated borrowers respectively.










2. If, instead, condition (19) does not hold
 
θ ≤ θ ≤ θ
 
, the contracts





• Finally, if condition (18) does not hold (θ < θ), then socially responsi-
ble banks are not active and the market for ethical projects does not ex-
ist: all borrowers accept the contract (BS0∗
0j ,BF0∗
0j ,I0∗
0j ) oﬀered by standard
lenders.
Proposition 1 shows that, if (18) holds (θ ≥ θ), two separated credit markets
are created: one market for ethical projects where only agents aware of social
issues trade and one for standard projects where only standard agents operate.
In fact, when the premium for social responsibility is suﬃciently high, it more
than compensates the lower expected proﬁtability of ethical projects so that
motivated borrowers prefer to trade with ethical banks. Finally, if the social




, motivated borrowers obtain a
contract that is more proﬁtable than the one obtained by the standard borrow-
ers. These results are in line with Besley and Ghatak’s (2005), where mission
oriented workers perfectly match with mission oriented ﬁrms of the same type
and social productivity increases.
4 Loan Agreements under Moral Hazard and
Adverse Selection on the Borrowers’ Side
We consider here the following informational structure: lenders’ corporate so-
cial responsibility is common knowledge, but lenders cannot observe neither the
borrowers’ behavior nor the borrowers’ motivation. As already mentioned, this
setting ﬁts a situation where lenders are banks with well known characteristics,
while borrowers are new ﬁrms without reputation. This context is interesting
since, when the premium for social responsibility is suﬃciently high (see Propo-
sition 1 above), motivated borrowers trading with ethical banks obtain better
contract conditions than standard borrowers trading with standard lenders: thus
standard borrowers could take advantage of their private information by pre-
tending to be motivated. Note that, in this latter case, since standard borrowers
mimicking motivated ones possibly misbehave, ethical banks could obtain neg-
ative proﬁts.
Lenders here simply know that the percentage of motivated borrowers in the
credit market is q whereas that of standard ones is 1−q. We call this game the
third-best.
16Note that, since borrowers’ motivation is part of the borrowers’ private infor-




0j ) and (BS1∗
1j ,BF1∗
1j ,I1∗
1j ) deﬁned before verify such a
self-selection constraint, those contracts can also be oﬀered in third-best (they
are envy free).




0j ) if condition (18) does not hold (θ < θ). In the latter case eth-
ical banks are not active and the two borrowers’ types become identical since
the premium for social responsibility is zero. Therefore, a direct consequence
of Proposition 1 is that, in third-best and when condition (18) does not hold





Let us consider now higher levels of the premium for social responsibil-




1j ) to contract (BS0∗
0j ,BF0∗
0j ,I0∗
0j ) when (18) holds




0j ) to contract (BS1∗
1j ,BF1∗
1j ,I1∗
1j ) when (18) holds but (19) does
not
 
θ ≤ θ ≤ θ
 




0j . In fact, in that case,
when they trade with standard lenders they receive a higher expected utility
than when they trade with socially responsible lenders:
pH∆B∗
0j + BF0∗






Summarizing, from the previous reasoning we know that when (18) holds but
not (19)
 
θ ≤ θ ≤ θ
 
, the second best contracts (BS0∗
0j ,BF0∗
0j ,I0∗










11) are envy free and can also be oﬀered
in third-best. In this case the credit market is fully segmented. Whereas, when
(18) does not hold (θ < θ), only standard lenders are active in the credit mar-
ket and the second-best contract (BS0∗
0j ,BF0∗
0j ,I0∗
0j ) is oﬀered to both borrowers’
types.





premium for social responsibility more than compensate non-ethical projects












since all borrowers are the same
when trading with standard lenders. Thus, concerning standard banks we can
state the following:
Remark 7 In third-best, standard banks oﬀer the second-best contract whatever
the size of the premium for social responsibility.




, ethical banks must oﬀer a self-selecting
contract to prevent standard borrowers from mimicking motivated ones. (Re-
mind that, to trade with ethical banks and mimic CSR, standard borrow-




11 ) designed for motivated agents is self-selecting if, when
17chosen by standard borrowers, it provides them with proﬁts that are weakly




0j). As a consequence, in the self-selection constraint of
the third-best maximization program, the term BS0∗
0j appears (see the proof of
Lemma 1 below).
Again, because of the assumption of Bertrand competition among lenders,
borrowers are endowed with all the bargaining power and obtain all the surplus
from trade in equilibrium. Thus, as in Section 3 we can solve the model as if
the borrowers were the ﬁrst movers and propose the contract in the ﬁrst period.
Importantly, since borrowers are the informed party, we consider here a case of
contract design by an informed principal (see Maskin and Tirole 1992 and also
Tirole 2006, page 264): when they observe the contract designed by borrowers,
socially responsible lenders possibly learn something about the borrowers’ type
and update their beliefs. The timing of the third-best game is equivalent to that
of the following game:
• First borrowers propose a contract to socially responsible lenders specify-
ing the type of investment k = 1.
• Second, socially responsible lenders accept or refuse the oﬀer.
• Third borrowers decide whether behave or misbehave.
• Finally, uncertainty concerning the project is solved and the contract is
executed.
We characterize the contract (BS1∗∗
11 ,BF1∗∗
11 ,I1∗∗
11 ) in the following lemma.




, standard borrowers obtain the second-best debt
contract. Motivated borrowers obtain a debt contract with lower revenue and in-
vestment than their second-best contract, but higher investment, than the second
best contract oﬀered to standard borrowers.
Proof. See the Appendix A.5.
In the Appendix we prove that the relevant maximization program to be
solved takes into account the self-selection constraint when the mimicker misbe-
haves (a = 0). This implies that the self-selection constraint is rather restrictive
so that the distortion from the second-best is quite important.
The following proposition summarizes all results in this section:
Proposition 2 Moral hazard and adverse selection on the borrowers’
side.





















11. The credit market is fully
segmented.
18• When (18) holds but not (19)
 
θ ≤ θ ≤ θ
 







11) are envy free and are also oﬀered in third-best. The
credit market is fully segmented.
• When (18) does not hold (θ < θ), then ethical banks are not active, the
market for ethical projects does not exist and both borrowers’ types obtain




The ﬁrst case described in Proposition 2 corresponds to the third-best equi-
librium when the premium for social responsibility more than compensate ethi-
cal projects low proﬁtability and, in second-best, motivated borrowers receive a
better contract. Here, in third-best, standard borrowers are the mimickers and
a self-selecting contract is oﬀered to motivated entrepreneurs who are worse oﬀ
with respect to the second best. In particular the latter obtain a contract that is
characterized by a higher investment but a lower expected revenue with respect
to standard borrowers, exactly as it occurs in the second-best for value of θ
such that θ ≤ θ ≤ θ (see Proposition 1). In the second case, instead, adverse
selection has no bite. Here the premium for social responsibility is characterized
by an intermediate size so that contracts designed for motivated borrowers are
not attractive for standard ones. The last case corresponds to the equilibrium
of third-best when standard projects proﬁtability more than compensate the
premium for social responsibility: all borrowers become equivalent to standard
entrepreneurs and no adverse selection issues arise.
5 Loan Agreements under Moral Hazard on the
Borrowers’ Side and Adverse Selection on the
Lenders’ Side.
In this section we brieﬂy analyze lenders’ private information on their corporate
social responsibility. As explained in Subsection 2.1, we capture here the so
called “strategic” corporate social responsibility, a situation where a ﬁrm can
pretend to be socially responsible to strength its market position. In our model,
standard lenders can be interested in mimicking ethical banks to trade with
motivated borrowers and solve the moral hazard problem in a cheaper way.
The timing is analogous to that of the previous sections.
First of all, socially responsible banks do not wish to mimic the standard
ones, given their commitment to only invest in ethical projects. The standard
lenders could mimic ethical banks, but it can be easily checked that they will
not. In fact, we have to consider again the possible diﬀerent sizes of the premium
for social responsibility. Suppose ﬁrst that (18) does not hold (θ < θ). Ethical
banks are not active and the equilibrium coincides with the second-best one.
Suppose now that condition (18) holds (θ ≥ θ). Ethical banks are active, but
all lenders are making zero proﬁts at the second-best equilibrium, irrespective




. Thus, the second best contracts
19are envy free (in a weak sense) and they can be implemented also in this last
case.
Thus we can state the following remark:
Remark 8 Moral hazard on the borrowers’ side and adverse selection
on the lenders’ side. Suppose that borrowers’ type is observable, but not that
of lenders. Moreover, lenders cannot observe the borrowers’ behavior.
Proposition 3 • If condition (18) holds (θ ≥ θ), then the credit market is







are oﬀered to standard and motivated borrowers respectively.
• If condition (18) does not hold (θ < θ), then socially responsible banks are
not active, the market for ethical projects does not exist and all borrowers
accept the contract (BS0∗
0j ,BF0∗
0j ,I0∗
0j ) oﬀered by standard lenders .
We ﬁnd a perfect market segmentation between agents aware of social issues
and standard ones also under moral hazard on the borrowers’ side and adverse
selection on the lenders’ side. However, contrary to what happens with the
previous information structure, no distortion from the second-best contract is
necessary here to reach such a result.
6 A Diﬀerent Interpretation: Microﬁnance
Our setting could be used to interpret also microcredit. We consider here only
moral hazard on the borrowers side, so that our microcredit model is formally
equivalent to that presented in section 3.
In the previous analysis and when (19) holds (θ ≥ θ), that is when the pre-
mium for social responsibility is suﬃciently high, the motivated borrowers exert
the role of the “good-type” in the agency relationship with the lender. In that
case the motivated borrowers repay the debt at a lower cost when matched with
a socially responsible lender.
Here we analyze a diﬀerent situation: the socially responsible lender is a
microﬁnance institution and the motivated borrower is a “microborrower”. In
this context the project type is not relevant and we will assume that a unique
type of project exists, what matters is uniquely the characteristics of the two
agents aware of social issues.
We have in mind, in particular, the idea of microﬁnance associated with
Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, winners of the 2006
Nobel Peace Prize. According to such an idea, microﬁnance institutions use
a group-based lending approach by which the peer-pressure within the group
leads the borrowers to follow through and use caution in conducting their ﬁnan-
cial aﬀairs with strict discipline, ensuring repayment eventually and allowing
the borrowers to develop good credit standing. We implicitly assume that a
standard forproﬁt bank is not able to apply the group-based lending approach
such that microborrower’s moral-hazard has a larger cost for a commercial bank.
20Finally, it is reasonable to assume that standard borrowers are not interested in
trading with microﬁnance institutions.
Within the previous interpretation, opportunistic behavior is more likely
when a microborrower meets a commercial bank than when he meets a microﬁ-
nance institution, because a standard bank is not as eﬃcient as a microﬁnance
institution in solving the moral hazard problem. We thus suppose that the
entrepreneurs payoﬀ is:
Uj = p(a)BS
ij + (1 − p(a))BF
ij − A + (1 − a) ˜ PI
The private beneﬁt parameter ˜ P ∈ {P0,P1}, with P1 < P0, depends on the
borrowers’ and the lenders’ type. Namely, ˜ P = P1 only if a microborrower
matches with a microﬁnance institution, and ˜ P = P0 otherwise.
As for the objective functions of the two types of lenders, since the project
type k is no more relevant in the present context, expressions (2) and (3) become
substantially equivalent.
Under the previous assumptions and with full information on the lenders’
and the borrowers’ types, the market is still fully segmented. Microﬁnance insti-
tutions will sign contracts only with microborrowers according to their mission
and commercial banks will loan only to forproﬁt entrepreneurs to reduce the
moral hazard cost rising in the agency relationship. Lenders’ proﬁt will be zero
in equilibrium. Moreover, since the moral hazard cost is the same in equilibrium
for the two bank types and contrary to the results in Section 3, the contracts
oﬀered to micro- and standard-borrowers in the second best equilibrium are the
same:
Remark 9 Microﬁnance under moral hazard. Suppose that both borrow-
ers’ and lenders’ types are observable, but lenders cannot observe the borrowers’













11) = (BS∗,BF∗,I∗). The credit mar-
ket is fully segmented.
The previous result depends on our assumption that the collateral A is not
part of the contract and it is the same for all agents. However, suppose that
the microﬁnance projects have a ﬁxed (minimal) size. If in our model we ﬁx
the level of investment and allow for diﬀerent amounts of collateral, a smaller
collateral can be suﬃcient to induce microborrower to behave when trading
with microﬁnance institutions than when trading with proﬁt maximizing banks,
because group lending can make the moral hazard problem less severe in the
former case. This can make microcredit proﬁtable for microﬁnance institutions,
but not for standard banks. The existing literature on microﬁnance (Stiglitz
1990, Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 1999 among others) investigates group
lending and peer monitoring as an eﬃcient tool to provide loans, we instead
model microborrowers as entrepreneurs who are riskier than standard borrowers
for commercial banks, but who can generate more eﬃcient relationships when
trading with microﬁnance institution.
21In the microﬁnance interpretation of our model, the case of loan agreements
under moral hazard and adverse selection on the borrowers’ side has little mean-
ing. In fact it is hard to think about microborrowers pretending to be standard
borrowers to obtain credit from a commercial bank. As already mentioned, in
the real world microborrowers and standard borrowers can be easily discrimi-
nated by commercial banks using collateral A. For that reason we think that the
appropriate model to analyze moral hazard and adverse selection in a market
with microﬁnance institutions and standard banks should diﬀerentiate contracts
using the collateral A as an endogenous variable. This has meaning in a richer
model where, as an example, there is a negative covariance between the col-
lateral and the private beneﬁt parameter P of potential borrowers. A negative
covariance implies that, on average, borrowers with higher wealth available as
collateral are also characterized by a lower private beneﬁt from misbehaving
(a higher cost of defaulting). This means that lenders can ﬁx a value of the
collateral suﬃciently high to screen the most part of bad borrowers. We leave
this analysis for future research.
7 Conclusion
Our paper investigates corporate ﬁnance of ethical banks. To the best of our
knowledge this analysis was still missing in the credit markets literature.
In our model there are two diﬀerent credit markets: the market for standard
projects and the market for ethical ones. We deﬁne ethical projects as projects
with both social and economic proﬁtability but a lower expected revenue with
respect to standard ones. We model ethical banks as lenders which are able to
commit to ﬁnance only ethical projects so that they are not interested in operat-
ing in the markets for standard projects. Motivated borrowers, instead, obtain
an additional beneﬁt (a premium for social responsibility) from trading with
ethical banks in the case their project is successful. This implies that motivated
borrowers prefer to trade with ethical banks as long as the contract conditions
are not too unfavorable with respect to those oﬀered by standard lenders. We
investigate how ethical banks and motivated borrowers interact together when
credit markets are competitive and also standard agents exist and, we consider
diﬀerent information structures. First we analyze the case where banks do not
observe borrowers’ behavior (the pure moral hazard case). We then investigate
the case where banks do not observe neither borrowers’ behavior nor borrowers’
motivation (the case of moral hazard and adverse selection on the borrowers’
side). Finally we brieﬂy consider the case where banks do not observe bor-
rowers’ behavior and borrowers do not observe the banks’ social responsibility
(the case of moral hazard on the borrowers’ side and adverse selection on the
lenders’ side). We also provide a possible reinterpretation of ethical banks as
microﬁnance institutions.
In the model standard lenders choose to not operate in the market for ethical
projects. We ﬁnd conditions such that only standard agents operate in the
market for standard projects and only agents aware of social issue trade in the
22market for ethical projects, implying that the market is fully segmented. All our
results depend on the interplay between two crucial parameters of the model:
the diﬀerence in proﬁtability of standard and ethical projects and the size of
the premium for social responsibility.
Intuitively ethical banks improve market eﬃciency by leading to perfect
matching between socially motivated agents on one side and standard ones on
the other side, provided that the premium for social responsibility is suﬃciently
high and/or the diﬀerence in proﬁtability between standard and ethical projects
is low enough. In fact, if the previous condition is satisﬁed, by giving credit to
motivated borrowers ethical banks can induce repayment of their loan at a lower
cost, because they solve more eﬃciently the moral hazard problem. However, if
the previous condition is not satisﬁed, then ethical banks are not active so that
the market for ethical projects does not exist.
We also show that both in the case where banks do not observe borrowers’
behavior and in the case where banks do not observe neither borrowers’ behavior
nor borrowers’ type, motivated borrowers obtain a higher funding with respect
to the standard ones. Put it diﬀerently, with and without adverse selection
motivated entrepreneurs have higher borrowing capacity. Finally we prove that
both banks’ types oﬀer debt contracts to their borrowers both under pure moral
hazard and under moral hazard and adverse selection.
In line with Bénabou and Tirole’s view of CSR, our model interprets eth-
ical banks as ﬁrms correcting some market failures in the credit market. In
particular, in equilibrium, standard lenders are only active in the market for
standard projects so that, without ethical banks, the market for ethical projects
will never exist. This suggests that, in the real world, ethical banks can be
welfare improving not only because they can solve more eﬃciently the moral
hazard problem when interacting with motivated borrowers, but also because
they allow the ﬁnancing of projects exerting a positive externality to the society.
An interesting extension of our model would be to analyze microﬁnance in-
stitutions in a similar but reacher model where borrowers’ collateral is endoge-
nously determined in the optimal loan contract (see our comments in Subsection
6).
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24A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Remark 1
The following proof is quite standard (see Tirole 2006), however we prefer to
insert it since it turns out to be useful to understand Remarks 2, 3 and 4 in
Subsection 3.2.





must be satisﬁed with equality. In fact, if








satisﬁed, but increasing the expected utility.














0j − A = pH
 





and substituting the previous expression in the objective function, it yields:
max
 




which implies that the borrower wishes to increase the investment, I0
0j, as much














has to be binding.
Now suppose that BF0
0j > 0. Hence we can clearly decrease it by a small
amount ∂BF0
0j and increase BS0
0j by another small amount ∂BS0
0j in such a way
that:
pH∂BS0







is still satisﬁed, U0








is now slack, a contradiction. Hence
BF0∗
0j = 0.
the lender oﬀers to the borrower a debt contract, with the value of the debt
D, satisfying D > RFI0
0j. Substituting the above result in (11) and recalling





























we obtain the equilibrium revenues of the bor-
rower in the good state.
A.2 Proof of Remark 3





should be satisﬁed with equality and substituting in
the objective function this implies that the borrower wishes to set I1
11 as large






11, the proof can follow






















The denominator of the rhs is positive because of (10). Hence I1
11 has to be
ﬁnite. Since the borrower wishes to set I1







Now suppose that BF1
11 > 0. We can reach a contradiction according to the
same lines of the proﬁt maximizing borrower. Hence BF1
11 = 0: again we have a
debt contract. Substituting BF1





, where (21) is taken









































A.3 Proof of Remark 4
If the socially responsible agent trading with an ethical bank gets more ﬁnancing
it can also invest more, that is, I1∗
11 ≥ I0∗


























0j (∆R0 − ∆R1)
The socially responsible entrepreneur trading with an ethical bank pays less if:
BS1∗
11 > BS0∗

























































pH (∆R0 − ∆R1)I0∗
0j
which is equivalent to (19). It is easy to prove that
pHP
∆p (pH∆R1 + RF − 1)
> 1
and hence (19) implies (18).
A.4 Proof of Remark 6
Motivated borrowers prefer to trade with socially responsible lenders if, by doing
so, they receive a higher expected utility than the one they would receive with
standard lenders:
pH∆B∗
11 + pHθ + BF1∗













































which is exactly our condition (18).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
First of all, remind that the ethical banks are indiﬀerent between ﬁnancing a
motivated borrower or a proﬁt maximizer one, provided that they undertake an
ethical project, other things equal. However, if an ethical bank wishes to satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint for the proﬁt maximizer (∆B10 ≥ P
∆pI1
10
where ∆B10 = BS1
10 − BF1
10 ), it cannot match the oﬀer of the commercial bank,
since standard projects have a higher expected return (see Remark 2). Hence,
under the assumption of the present Lemma, if the ethical bank wishes to ﬁnance
ethical projects, it needs to attract motivated agents and satisfy their incentive
compatibility constraint. Under that contract, if the proﬁt maximizer borrower
27mimics the motivated one, he will misbehave. Therefore, the problem to be





pH∆B11 + pHθ + BF1
11 − A










pH∆R1 + RF − 1
 
I1
11 − pH∆B11 − BF1



















must be binding, otherwise parties could
reach the second-best program which is not feasible by assumption, because
in the second-best contracts the proﬁt maximizer borrower would prefer the
motivated borrower’s contract. Hence
pHBS0∗






0j + ∆p∆B11 − PI1
11
Let us make the working assumption that the optimal contract is a debt contract,
that is: BF1
11 = 0. We ﬁrst characterize the optimal debt contract. Then we
prove that no other contract can do better than the optimal debt one. Notice



































































































































































We now check if the participation constraint of the lender is satisﬁed. If we







pH∆R1 + RF − 1
 
I1
11 − pH∆B11 + A =
 






































∆ppH − RF − pH∆R0
A +
 





θ + ∆pθ ≥ 0
or:
 





θ + ∆pθ ≥ ApH
∆R0 − ∆R1
1 + P
∆ppH − RF − pH∆R0




















Hence the participation constraint is surely satisﬁed if:
 































∆ppH − RF − pH∆R0
which boils down into
pHP
pH∆R1 + RF − 1












pH − RF − pH∆R1 ≥ 0
which is certainly satisﬁed for (13). Hence the participation constraint of the




















at a lower investment level, I1
11, and (more importantly) at a bigger





(again taken with equality).
This means that the former is characterized for the highest ∆B11, which is also
BS1
11 , since BF1
11 = 0, in the intersection of all constraints. This implies that
in the same point the expected utility of the borrower is the highest, as can






















is characterized by the system
   





















pL (pH∆R1 + RF − 1) + pHP
∆B11 =
 




pL(pH∆R1 + RF − 1) + pHP
30This is the optimal debt contract. Now we will prove that this is the best overall










with equality and let us
diﬀerentiate it with respect to BF1
11 , we ﬁnd the following system:
   























P + pH∆R1 + RF − 1
(pH∆R1 + RF − 1)pL + PpH
Hence the expected utility varies with dBF1











pH∆R1 + RF − 1
 
(pH∆R1 + RF − 1)pL + pHB
< 0










are binding is just a debt
contract, that is with BF1
11 = 0.

































Hence the expected utility of the borrower is constant even if we let BF1
11 to
vary. However we already proved that for BF1











are binding, and that the latter is also the
optimal contract. Therefore the best contract for this program is BF1








pL(pH∆R1 + RF − 1) + pHP






pH∆R1 + RF − 1
 
+ pHP − ∆ppH (∆R0 − ∆R1)

















pL(pH∆R1 + RF − 1) + pHP






pH∆R1 + RF − 1
 
+ pHP + pLpH (∆R0 − ∆R1)











11 do not depend on θ and, by comparison with expres-





Moreover, since when condition (19) holds the contracts are such that BS1∗
11 >
BS0∗
0j (see Proposition 1), we have that BS1∗
11 > BS0∗
0j > BS1∗∗
11 . We showed be-









































is positively sloped, it must also be true
that the level of investment in the third best is lower than in the second best,
I1∗∗
11 < I1∗
11 (see the ﬁgure).
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